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ABSTRACT—The media and academic dialogue surrounding high-stakes 
decisionmaking by robotics applications has been dominated by a focus on 
morality. But the tendency to do so while overlooking the role that legal 
incentives play in shaping the behavior of profit-maximizing firms risks 
marginalizing the field of robotics and rendering many of the deepest 
challenges facing today’s engineers utterly intractable. This Essay attempts 
to both halt this trend and offer a course correction. Invoking Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s canonical analogy of the “bad man . . . who cares 
nothing for . . . ethical rules,” it demonstrates why philosophical 
abstractions like the trolley problem—in their classic framing—provide a 
poor means of understanding the real-world constraints robotics engineers 
face. Using insights gleaned from the economic analysis of law, it argues 
that profit-maximizing firms designing autonomous decisionmaking 
systems will be less concerned with esoteric questions of right and wrong 
than with concrete questions of predictive legal liability. Until such time as 
the conversation surrounding so-called “moral machines” is revised to 
reflect this fundamental distinction between morality and law, the thinking 
on this topic by philosophers, engineers, and policymakers alike will 
remain hopelessly mired. Step aside, roboticists—lawyers have this one. 
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You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good 
one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and 
therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction 
between morality and law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule 
which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless 
to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want 
to keep out of jail if he can. 
—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is the year 2031, and an autonomous vehicle faces a grave choice: it 
must either collide with a child who unexpectedly runs into its path or 
swerve so violently as to overturn the car along with the passenger inside. 
Given the vehicle’s speed, either choice spells serious injury—even death. 
Which should it choose: passenger or child? 
In October 2016, Mercedes-Benz2 made global headlines by becoming 
one of the first major automakers to proffer an answer to this question of 
philosophical proportions.3 Speaking to Car and Driver Magazine, 
 
 1 The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
 2 The type of futuristic scenario outlined above may arrive much sooner than 2031. In January 
2017, Uber’s then-CEO Travis Kalanick announced that Daimler would “introduce and operate their 
own self-driving cars on Uber’s ridesharing network” in “the coming years.” Travis Kalanick, Uber and 
Daimler Join Forces on Self-Driving Cars, UBER NEWSROOM (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://newsroom.uber.com/uber-daimler-self-driving-cars/ [https://perma.cc/QRA8-VJ6X]. Uber’s 
partnerships with pioneering manufacturers of self-driving vehicles do not end with Daimler, however. 
See Bryan Casey, A Loophole Large Enough to Drive an Autonomous Vehicle Through, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 73, 80 (2016) (discussing Uber’s use of self-driving Volvo XC90 SUVs); Andrew 
Hawkins, Meet Uber’s First Self-Driving Car, VERGE (May 19, 2016, 8:07 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/5/19/11711890/uber-first-image-self-driving-car-pittsburgh-ford-fusion 
[https://perma.cc/K95L-3SG9] (discussing Uber’s use of self-driving Ford Fusions); see also Alex 
Davies, Uber’s Self-Driving Crash Proves We Need Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2017, 3:10 
PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/uber-self-driving-crash-tempe-arizona/ [https://perma.cc/W4YJ-
D6LF] (describing the benefits of self-driving Ubers and as well as the need for increased testing). 
 3 David Z. Morris, Mercedes-Benz’s Self-Driving Cars Would Choose Passenger Lives Over 
Bystanders, FORTUNE (Oct. 15, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/15/mercedes-self-driving-car-ethics/ 
[https://perma.cc/F55P-YQVT]; see also Mike Brown, Mercedes’s Self-Driving Cars Will Kill 
Pedestrians Over Drivers, INVERSE MAG. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.inverse.com/article/22204-
mercedes-benz-self-driving-cars-ai-ethics [https://perma.cc/WKT4-6NZZ]; Lindsay Dodgson, Why 
Mercedes Plants to Let Its Self-Driving Cars Kill Pedestrians in Dicey Situations, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 
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Mercedes executive Christoph von Hugo implied that, in such a situation, 
the company’s “future autonomous [vehicles] will save the car’s driver and 
passengers, even if that means sacrificing the lives of pedestrians.”4 
According to von Hugo, the rationale was simple: “If all you know for sure 
is that one death can be prevented, then that’s your first priority.”5 
Within days, however, von Hugo’s words raised a media fracas large 
enough to elicit an official clarification from the auto giant.6 In response to 
criticism over the executive’s statement, Mercedes-Benz claimed von Hugo 
had been misquoted, insisting that the company “continue[d] to adhere to 
the principle of providing the highest possible level of safety for all road 
users.”7 
But, contentious as von Hugo’s particular rationale proved to be, 
virtually no experts contest the powerful assumption underlying the 
rationale.8 For better or worse, a world where millions of robots will be 
entrusted with making life-or-death decisions is no longer the exclusive 
province of science fiction.9 It is a fast-approaching reality—one that, many 
leading scholars argue, will require “bring[ing] artificial agents into the 
domain of ethics.”10 
These scholars belong to a rapidly advancing field known as “machine 
ethics,” which seeks to “frame [the] discussion” surrounding morally 
consequential robots “in a way that constructively guides the engineering 
task of designing” them.11 Those leading the charge argue that engineers 
“need to embed in [robots] some ethical guidelines,”12 so they will “do the 
 
12, 2016, 10:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/mercedes-benz-self-driving-cars-programmed-
save-driver-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/GJ5L-DNB8]; Natalie Walters, Mercedes-Benz Will Let Self-
Driving Cars Hit Pedestrians to Protect Passengers, STREET (Oct. 13, 2016, 12:25 PM), 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13852444/1/mercedes-benz-will-let-self-driving-cars-hit-pedestrians-
to-protect-passengers.html [https://perma.cc/7K2L-MP2N]. 
 4 See Morris, supra note 3. 
 5 Michael Taylor, Self-Driving Mercedes-Benzes Will Prioritize Occupant over Pedestrians, CAR & 
DRIVER MAG. (Oct. 7, 2016, 5:27 PM), http://blog.caranddriver.com/self-driving-mercedes-will-
prioritize-occupant-safety-over-pedestrians/ [https://perma.cc/45UE-7JMQ]. 
 6 See Morris, supra note 3. 
 7 See Daimler Clarifies: Neither Programmers Nor Automated Systems Are Entitled to Weigh the 
Value of Human Lives, DAIMLER (Oct. 18, 2016), http://media.daimler.com/marsMediaSite/en/
instance/ko/Daimler-clarifies-Neither-programmers-nor-automated-systems-.xhtml?oid=14131869 
[https://perma.cc/X22B-UW5G]. 
 8 See infra notes 51–63 and accompanying text. 
 9 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 10 WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM 
WRONG 16 (2009) [hereinafter MORAL MACHINES]. 
 11 Id. at 6, 34. 
 12 Joshua Greene et al., Embedding Ethical Principles in Collective Decision Support Systems, 
30 PROC. AAAI CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 4147 (2016). 
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right thing”13 in morally loaded situations like those anticipated by von 
Hugo.14 This, they insist, “is fundamentally an ethics problem”15—one that 
“will require looking at the origins of human morality”16 to light the way 
for engineers designing “moral machines”17 with “values [that are] clear 
and consistent.”18 
But, compelling as this lofty vision of robotics engineering may 
appear at first blush, there is just one tiny detail standing in its way: the 
entire legal system. After all, liability for injury is governed not by moral 
codes, but by legal codes. Properly understood, the “practical importance of 
th[is] distinction between morality and law”19—to appropriate the canonical 
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes—holds profoundly different 
implications for the role of ethics in robotics engineering.20 
Economic analysis of law teaches that profit-maximizing firms will 
design their robots to behave not as good moral philosophers, but as 
Holmesian bad men—concerned less with “ethical rule[s]” than with the 
legal rules that dictate whether they will be “made to pay money” and can 
“keep out of jail.”21 Far from following a “clear and consistent”22 moral 
code, optimized systems will instead follow an amoral code that reflects the 
messy economic realities of society’s imperfect legal regimes. These robots 
will not maximize morality, but minimize liability. And if the goal of 
machine ethics “is to frame discussion in a way that constructively guides 
the engineering task of designing” these so-called “moral machines,”23 it 
must begin by recognizing that high-minded ethics will surely take a 
backseat to amoral economics. 
Yet “dismal”24 as this description may initially seem, its implications 
are surprisingly sanguine. Contrary to the current consensus within the field 
 
 13 Kris Hammond, Ethics and Artificial Intelligence: The Moral Compass of a Machine, RECODE 
(Apr. 13, 2016, 2:22 PM), http://www.recode.net/2016/4/13/11644890/ethics-and-artificial-intelligence-
the-moral-compass-of-a-machine [https://perma.cc/X85D-2FLD]. 
 14 See infra notes 51–63 and accompanying text. 
 15 Patrick Lin, Why Ethics Matters for Autonomous Cars, in AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: 
TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 69, 73 (Markus Maurer et al. eds, 2015). 
 16 MORAL MACHINES, supra note 10, at 8. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Joshua Greene, Our Driverless Dilemma, 352 SCIENCE 1514, 1515 (2016); see also infra notes 
51–63 and accompanying text. 
 19 The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 459. 
 20 See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 21 The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 459. 
 22 Greene, supra note 18, at 1515. 
 23 MORAL MACHINES, supra note 10, at 6. 
 24 See ROBERT DIXON, THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM “DISMAL SCIENCE” TO DESCRIBE ECONOMICS 1 
(1999) (discussing Thomas Carlyle’s famous phrase). 
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of machine ethics, the true designers of machine morality will not be the 
cloistered engineering teams of tech giants like Google, Tesla, or 
Mercedes, but ordinary citizens. As democratic stakeholders, they alone 
will possess the power to narrow the gap “between morality and law.”25 It 
will be their collective engineering task to design a legal system that 
ensures “a bad [robot] has as much reason as a good one” to behave 
ethically—ultimately, rendering meaningless the “practical importance of 
the distinction” between amoral machines and moral machines.26 
I. A CRASH COURSE IN MACHINE ETHICS 
Our machines need not hesitate when they see the Trolley coming. 
They will act in accord with whatever moral or ethical code we provide 
them and the value determinations that we set. 
—Kris Hammond27 
Modern robotics28 begins with Isaac Asimov.29 More than half a 
century ago, the beloved science fiction writer inspired a generation of 
rising engineers to begin “thinking about how minds might work”30 by 
envisioning a future inhabited by “mechanical men” whose intellectual and 
physical abilities rivaled those of their biological counterparts.31 Mindful of 
the profound implications posed by these agents, however, Asimov’s 
 
 25 See The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 459. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Hammond, supra note 13. 
 28 “Few complex technologies have a single, stable, uncontested definition. Robots are no 
exception.” Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 529 (2015). 
For stylistic purposes, this Essay uses “robot” and “robotics” interchangeably with “artificial 
intelligence” (“AI”). All three terms lack a universally accepted definition but, in this Essay, refer 
broadly to any “computerized system that exhibits behavior that is commonly thought of as requiring 
intelligence.” EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH., 
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 6 (Oct. 2016). Further, this Essay’s scope is 
limited to “Narrow AI,” which refers to intelligent computer systems capable of “address[ing] specific 
application areas.” Id. at 7. It does not extend to “General AI,” which “refers to a notional future AI 
system that exhibits apparently intelligent behavior at least as advanced as a person across the full range 
of cognitive tasks.” Id. The “current consensus of the private-sector expert community . . . is that 
General AI will not be achieved for at least decades.” Id. 
 29 NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 25 (2010), http://ai.stanford.edu/~nilsson/QAI/qai.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEY9-EVY7] 
(noting that the “quest for artificial intelligence, quixotic or not, begins with dreams like [Asimov’s]”). 
 30 John Markoff, Technology; A Celebration of Isaac Asimov, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/12/business/technology-a-celebration-of-isaac-
asimov.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/JZ8H-8NE8] (quoting the computer science pioneer and 
founder of MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Marvin Minsky, who wrote: “After [Asimov’s 
story] ‘Runaround’ appeared in . . . March 1942 . . . I never stopped thinking about how minds might 
work.”). 
 31 ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround, in I, ROBOT (Bantam Dell 2004) (1950). 
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fictional engineers programmed the “robots” with directives meant to 
ensure their unwavering alignment with human values: 
A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm. 
A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such 
orders would conflict with the First Law. 
A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not 
conflict with the First or Second Laws. 32 
With these three precepts in place, Asimov’s engineers believed they 
could rest easy—having instilled in their robots a set of laws sufficient to 
steer them safely through any conceivable dilemma.33 If only life were so 
simple.34 
Among the many shortcomings of Asimov’s speciously watertight set 
of laws is its incompatibility with another set of slightly greater notoriety—
Newton’s. An object in motion tends to stay in motion, after all. And if a 
contemporary robot, such as a driverless car, were to unexpectedly 
encounter a jaywalker while travelling at full speed, sheer momentum 
could force the vehicle into a tragic choice between a collision with the 
pedestrian or an avoidance maneuver so violent as to endanger the 
passenger.35 Violating Asimov’s First Law, under such circumstances, 
 
 32 Id. at 37. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Asimov was not naïve to the fallibility of his laws. See Keith Abney, Robotics, Ethical Theory, 
and Metaethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 35, 43 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012) (“[I]n story after story, Asimov 
demonstrated that [his] three simple, hierarchically arranged rules could lead to deadlocks when, for 
example, the robot received conflicting instructions from two people, or when protecting one person 
might cause harm to others.”). Asimov remarked that “[t]here was just enough ambiguity in the Three 
Laws to provide the conflicts and uncertainties required for new stories, and, to my great relief, it 
seemed always to be possible to think up a new angle out of the sixty-one words of the Three Laws.” 
ISAAC ASIMOV, THE REST OF THE ROBOTS 43 (1964). 
 35 This claim has been convincingly argued by experts too numerous to list exhaustively. See, 
e.g., Lin, supra note 15, at 75 (lamenting the “daunting number of factors” to account for in an 
inevitable collision between a driverless car and another person or object); Thierry Fraichard & 
Hajime Asama, Inevitable Collision States: A Step Towards Safer Robots?, 18 ADVANCED 
ROBOTICS 1001, 1001 (2004) (describing the “inevitable collision state” of a robotic system, which 
occurs when the future trajectory of the system will inevitably lead to a collision); Noah Goodall, 
Ethical Decision Making During Automated Vehicle Crashes, TRANSP. RES. REC. J. TRANSP. RES. 
BOARD 1, 3 (2014) (noting that “[w]hile any engineering system can fail, it is important to distinguish 
that, for automated vehicles, even a perfectly-functioning system cannot avoid every collision”); Jeffrey 
K. Gurney, Crashing into the Unknown: An Examination of Crash-Optimization Algorithms Through 
the Two Lanes of Ethics and Law, 79 ALB. L. REV. 183, 195–99 (2016) (discussing the implications 
behind an autonomous vehicle having to hit one of two motorcycles or cars with drivers present). 
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would be unavoidable. The question would thus become one of triage: who 
should the robot imperil? 
This type of lesser-of-evils dilemma, where injury is both inevitable 
and variable, is known as a “trolley problem”—a term coined by the 
philosopher Judith Thomson in a now-classic thought experiment dating 
back to 1976.36 In its most popular form, the experiment posits an observer 
who is witness to a runaway trolley car barreling toward five unwitting 
workers on the tracks ahead.37 The observer, however, is standing at a 
switch. If pulled, the switch will divert the trolley onto another track where 
only one unlucky worker awaits.* 
Tragedy of some kind is foreordained, but the observer holds the 
proverbial power to steer fate: “turn the trolley, killing the one,” or “refrain 
from turning the trolley, killing the five?”38 
 
 36 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 MONIST 204, 206 
(1976). Although Thomson coined the term “trolley problem,” the first articulation of the thought 
experiment originated with the philosopher Philippa Foot. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion 
and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 1, 3 (1967). 
 37 Thomson’s experiment asked subjects to imagine themselves as the trolley driver rather than as 
an outside observer at a switch. 
 *Illustrations by Samuel Granados of The Washington Post; reused with permission. Some images 
have been slightly altered for pedagogical purposes. 
 38 See Thomson, supra note 36, at 206. 
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When surveyed, the vast majority of respondents—usually around 
90%––choose to divert the trolley away from the five.39 But anyone 
tempted to interpret these results as a sign of moral consensus should first 
consult the battery of similar surveys showing that even the slightest of 
modifications to the original experiment is apt to elicit a dramatically 
different response. Ask, for example, whether respondents would save five 
workers by steering the trolley toward a relative or loved one, and the 
percentage that pulls the switch takes a significant downward turn.40 
The consequences, in their most abstract sense, remain the same: 
sacrifice one to spare five. But for many, the moral intuition changes—
often without a consistent rationale.41 
Even a formal philosophical education offers no antidote to this 
apparent moral confusion. According to a 2009 survey conducted by David 
Bourget and David Chalmers, widespread disagreement over the 
appropriate response to Thomson’s original experiment exists even among 
professional philosophers.42 Of those polled, only 68% reported they would 
 
 39 John Cloud, Would You Kill One Person to Save Five? New Research on a Classic Debate, TIME 
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://healthland.time.com/2011/12/05/would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-five-new-
research-on-a-classic-debate/ [https://perma.cc/U8K3-GQET]. 
 40 April Bleske-Rechek et al., Evolution and the Trolley Problem: People Save Five Over One 
Unless the One is Young, Genetically Related, or a Romantic Partner, 4 J. SOC., EVOLUTIONARY, & 
CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 115, 119–21, 124 (2010), http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/ebs/4/3/115.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q9Z5-EEBX] (finding that only 24.8% of study participants would have pulled the 
lever on the lone target when the target was a romantic partner). 
 41 Id. at 126. 
 42 David Bourget & David Chalmers, What Do Philosophers Believe?, 170 PHIL. STUD. 465, 477 
(2014). 
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pull the switch—with a further 8% electing not to intervene, and the 
remainder indicating indecision of some sort.43 Although it is easy to 
dismiss these scattershot opinions as yet further evidence of the perennial 
stereotype of the “contrarian philosopher,” the fact remains that those who 
have had most occasion to contemplate the perplexities of the problem are 
those most perplexed by it. 
After spending decades as an object of little more than academic 
fascination, however, the trolley problem recently crashed into the cultural 
mainstream thanks, in part, to the rapid advances made in robotic vehicle 
technology. Nowadays, killer robot spinoffs of Thomson’s classic thought 
experiment—pitting humanity’s fuzzy moral intuitions against the steely 
logic of consumer-ready driverless cars—are as apt to appear in popular 
media outlets as in scholarly journals. This time in the limelight, however, 
has brought the problem no nearer to a universal resolution. In fact, the 
opposite has occurred. The problem has come to stand as a synecdoche for 
the dizzying complexity of humanity’s deepest-seated moral differences. 
But while society as a whole may remain agnostic to the trolley 
problem, engineers at the cutting edge of robotics are afforded no such 
luxury. For them, trolley-like problems are not mere philosophical 
curiosities. They are real-world contingencies that require prospective 
programming.44 Those designing the decisionmaking systems behind 
autonomous vehicles, weaponized drones, and countless other emerging 
robotics applications cannot simply shrug their shoulders. Rather, they 
must decide in advance how their systems will respond when life and limb 
are on the line. Resolution of some sort is simply unavoidable. As the 
scholars Sven Nyholm and Jilles Smids note, even choosing not to program 
a response to morally loaded situations “amounts to knowingly 
relinquishing the important responsibility we have to try to control” such 
systems.45 
Though a world where robots hold human lives in the balance may 
still read like a description better suited for Asimov’s science fiction, it is a 
modern engineering reality. These machines are not merely coming—many 
have already arrived. And it is an unflinching recognition of this fact that 
has spurred many leading scholars to call for a moral reckoning in the field 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 See, e.g., Sven Nyholm & Jilles Smids, The Ethics of Accident-Algorithms for Self-Driving Cars: 
An Applied Trolley Problem?, 19 J. ETHICAL THEORY & PRACT. 1276, 1278 (2016) (showing why a 
prospective engineering approach to even edge cases is necessary); see also Goodall, supra note 35, at 
3 (explaining inevitable collision states). 
 45 See Nyholm & Smids, supra note 44, at 1279. 
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of robotics—with, perhaps, no work more influential than Moral Machines: 
Teaching Robots Right from Wrong.46 
II. OF MACHINES AND (BAD) MEN 
In the future, moral philosophy will be a key industry sector . . . . You 
would want . . . [robots] preloaded with a pretty good set of 
values . . . . So presumably the robot companies will get their values 
loaded into the robot from a values company. 
—Stuart Russell47 
The year is 2009, and visionary tech companies like Google are only 
beginning to take their first secretive steps toward developing autonomous 
vehicles.48 DeepMind’s earth-shaking “Go” victory over the grandmaster 
Lee Sedol—the robotics community’s own “Kasparov moment”49—will 
not come for another half-decade.50 To have surveyed expert opinion for 
the most ethically exacting emerging technologies then would have likely 
produced a shortlist dominated by the fields of nanotechnology, genetic 
engineering, or perhaps stem cell research. But Yale University’s Wendell 
Wallach and co-author Colin Allen saw the writing on the wall—and it was 
written in computer code. 
In their 2009 book, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from 
Wrong, the two laid out an urgent––and strikingly prescient––vision of a 
near future replete with “autonomous [robotics] systems . . . increasingly in 
charge of a variety of decisions that have ethical ramifications.”51 And 
 
 46 See infra notes 48–56 and accompanying text. 
 47 Queena Sook Kim, Stuart Russell on Why Moral Philosophy Will Be Big Business in Tech, 
KQED NEWS (Oct. 27, 2015), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2015/10/27/stuart-russell-on-a-i-and-how-
moral-philosophy-will-be-big-business/ [https://perma.cc/NGU5-8HHF] (quoting Stuart Russell, co-
author of Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach). Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach is 
considered the standard textbook in the field, used by over 1,334 universities in 118 countries. 1334 
Schools Worldwide That Have Adopted AIMA, U.C. BERKELEY (Feb. 20, 2017), 
http://aima.cs.berkeley.edu/adoptions.html [https://perma.cc/5GVN-AZZ5]. 
 48 Adam Fisher, Google’s Self-Driving Cars: A Quest for Acceptance, POPULAR SCI. (Sept. 18, 
2013), http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2013-09/google-self-driving-car [https://perma.cc/V5PK-
Z2VT]. 
 49 The phrase refers to IBM Deep Blue’s defeat of the world chess champion Garry Kasparov in 
1997. See Matt McFarland, Google Just Mastered a Game That Vexed Scientists—and Their 
Machines—For Decades, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/innovations/wp/2016/01/27/google-just-mastered-a-game-thats-vexed-scientists-for-decades/ 
[https://perma.cc/DGR7-LADJ] (discussing the phrase “Kasparov moment”). 
 50 Cade Metz, In a Huge Breakthrough, Google’s AI Beats a Top Player at the Game of Go, WIRED 
MAG. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/in-a-huge-breakthrough-googles-ai-beats-a-top-
player-at-the-game-of-go/ [https://perma.cc/NU9X-3FGZ]. Go is an ancient Eastern strategy game that 
is comparable to chess, though far more computationally complex. Id. 
 51 MORAL MACHINES, supra note 10, at 15. 
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while acknowledging that “a concern for safety and societal benefits ha[d] 
always been at the forefront of engineering,” the scholars cautioned that 
preventing this sci-fi-like future from taking a dystopian turn demanded a 
qualitatively different approach to designing complex robotics—one that 
went far “beyond traditional product safety.”52 
Their solution? An engineering undertaking of Asimovian ambition: 
“to bring artificial agents into the domain of ethics” by programming them 
in accordance with explicit “moral standards.”53 But rising to meet “the 
engineering challenge entailed in going from Aristotle to Asimov and 
beyond,” they stressed, would be no easy feat.54 Rather, it would “require 
looking at the origins of human morality as viewed in the fields of 
evolution, learning and development, neuropsychology, and philosophy” to 
apply “[t]he values and concerns expressed in the world’s religious and 
philosophical traditions . . . to machines.”55 Thus, they called for scholars 
of diverse backgrounds to coalesce around a formal “discipline of artificial 
morality” which, they hoped, would “frame discussion in a way that 
constructively guide[d] the engineering task” of “building explicit ethical 
reasoning into [robotics] system[s].”56 
Since Moral Machines’s call to ethical arms in 2009, the number of 
scholars to have joined the ranks of this emerging discipline—now widely 
known as “machine ethics”—has grown too large to catalog, except by 
representative sample. Like Wallach and Allen, these scholars assert that 
robotics engineers will “need to embed in [machines] some ethical 
guidelines, so they can act in their environment following values that are 
aligned to the human ones.”57 Doing so, they insist, will require first 
“figur[ing] out how to make our values clear and consistent.”58 This, they 
argue, “is fundamentally an ethics problem”59––one that may mean big 
business for “moral philosophy” in the future.60 Indeed, with society “about 
to endow millions of vehicles with autonomy,” they say, “serious 
consideration of algorithmic morality has never been more urgent.”61 Yet, 
whether these algorithms should ultimately be “deontological,” 
 
 52 Id. at 4, 17. 
 53 Id. at 16, 78–81. 
 54 Id. at 8. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 6, 30–32. 
 57 Greene et al., supra note 12, at 4147. 
 58 Greene, supra note 18, at 1515. 
 59 Lin, supra note 15, at 73. 
 60 See Kim, supra note 47. 
 61 Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff & Iyad Rahwan, The Social Dilemma of Autonomous 
Vehicles, 352 SCIENCE 1573, 1576 (2016). 
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“consequentialist,” or of another philosophic school entirely, is still a 
matter of debate.62 “For 21st-century moral philosophers,” they predict, 
“this may be where the rubber meets the road.”63 
But compelling as this ethics-based vision of robotics engineering 
may appear at first blush, it essentially ignores the fact that the law already 
occupies the field. After all, liability for injury is governed by legal codes, 
not moral codes. And in a world where firms can influence their threat of 
public sanction by acting in accordance with legal standards, economics 
teaches that man’s laws—not moral laws—can be expected to play the 
dominant role in shaping profit-maximizing behavior.64 
This insight, known as liability minimization, is “foundational” to 
economic analysis of law.65 Its premise is straightforward. For profit-
maximizing firms, an “ex post damages system translates into ex ante 
[changes to behavior] because the prospect of civil liability encourages 
organizations . . . to minimize the justiciable harm they cause.”66 The 
crucial adjective, of course, is “justiciable.” Rational, forward-looking 
firms are not incentivized to minimize harm per se, but only those harms 
that the governing liability regime will force them to pay for.67 
To illustrate the allocative role that the legal system plays in shaping 
liability-minimizing behavior, consider the following hypothetical. A group 
of teenagers is playing a ball game known as Jackpot. The game involves a 
designated thrower, plus five others vying to catch the ball when it is 
lobbed in their direction. In this instance, one such lob goes awry—sending 
the ball bouncing into the street. Eager to be the first to retrieve it, all five 
teenagers dash across the road—directly into the path of an oncoming 
autonomous vehicle whose view of them, until that moment, had been 
obscured by parked cars lining the sidewalk. Even with its superhuman 
reaction time, the vehicle’s system cannot safely avoid a collision. Instead, 
 
 62 J. Christian Gerdes & Sarah Thornton, Implemental Ethics for Autonomous Vehicles, 
in  AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS, supra note 15, at  90–94. 
 63 See Greene, supra note 18, at 1515. 
 64 See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 65 Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management, 2 J. TORT L. 1 (2008). 
 66 As Schlanger notes, “Liability minimization is, of course, weighted against accident-prevention 
costs.” Id. at 1 n.1. See also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
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Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972) (“If . . . the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the costs 
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case the enterprise is made liable, in the expectation that self-interest will lead it to adopt the 
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 67 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 1661, 1667–82 (A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein eds., 2002). 
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it faces a choice. It must either strike the five teenagers or swerve so 
suddenly as to overturn the vehicle and the passenger inside. Either option 
is likely to result in serious injury, or even death. 
But rather than stopping the description short, let us bring the 
hypothetical a step closer to reality by adding a final consideration that the 
trolley problem so conspicuously lacks: a legal liability regime. 
Imagine, further, that the vehicle is operating within a jurisdiction that 
holds firms “strictly liable” for any damages their autonomous vehicles 
cause—meaning, in this instance, that the firm must pay for any harm done 
to the teenagers regardless of whether or not they are at fault for the 
accident.68 With this liability regime in view, the “optimal” choice for a 
profit-maximizing firm suddenly becomes straightforward. Given that the 
firm must pay for all resultant injuries, the decision boils down to simple 
arithmetic. A compensatory payout to one victim is cheaper than similarly 
expensive payouts to five. Thus, a profit-maximizing firm’s autonomous 
vehicle should swerve.69 
  
 
 68 Id. at 1667. 
 69 This is, of course, a necessary oversimplification. An essay of far greater length than this one 
could be written on the warped incentive signals conceivably sent by transaction costs, first- and third-
party insurance intermediaries, administrative costs, technical limitations, agency costs, information 
costs, human error and incompetence, consumer psychology, potential media backlash, and judicial and 
regulatory uncertainty. But as Schlanger herself emphatically states, “[A]ll these caveats operate only at 
the edges of the main point, which is that . . . damage actions function to price and internalize to risk-
creating organizations many harms . . . that would otherwise remain externalities.” See Schlanger, supra 
note 65, at 4. Robot behavior that accounts for these “caveats” will be no more ethical than in the 
simplified hypothetical above. Rather, the robots’ profit-maximizing behavior will simply be more 
nuanced. 
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Now imagine an identical hypothetical, but this time in a jurisdiction 
that recognizes the legal defense of “contributory negligence”—meaning, 
in this instance, that the firm will not be held liable for injury caused by its 
autonomous vehicle if the victims’ own negligence contributed to the 
accident.70 Under this liability regime, the optimal economic choice is the 
opposite. Because the teenagers’ negligent behavior would be said to have 
“contributed” to the collision, the firm would not be held liable for their 
injuries. Thus, the decision would again be reduced to arithmetic. A 
compensatory payout to one victim—i.e., the passenger—is more 




 70 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 67, at 1669. 
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Note that the two hypotheticals are morally indistinguishable. But 
legally, they are altogether distinct. It is this very distinction—what the 
canonical jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to as the “distinction 
between morality and law”—that many leading lights within the field of 
machine ethics fail to take into account.71 
In an 1897 essay, today regarded as among the “most important . . . 
ever written by an American on the law,”72 Holmes set out to dispel what 
he regarded as a commonplace “confusion” between morality and 
legality.73 Invoking the analogy of a “bad man” devoid of moral scruples, 
Holmes described the legal system’s distinct ability to give even a bad 
actor “as much reason as a good one” to behave morally.74 The key, 
according to Holmes, was to pull not on the actors’ heartstrings but on their 
purse strings. For even “[a] man who cares nothing for . . . ethical rule[s],” 
he observed, “is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made 
to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.”75 
To this end, Holmes viewed the legal system as an “instrument of . . . 
prophesy”—enabling society to “predict” the behavior of rational, self-
interested actors by “look[ing] at [the law] as a bad man” would.76 And 
 
 71 The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 459. 
 72 See Albert Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred Years 
Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353, 354 (1997). 
 73 The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 459. 
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 76 Id. at 458–59. 
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though Holmes couched his analogy in explicitly ethical terms, he could as 
easily have used the phrase “blank man”—or the more familiar “blank 
slate”—to communicate the same point. With the right legal incentives, 
Holmes stressed, even amoral actors could be made to behave 
indistinguishably from moral ones.77 But for Holmes, the tale was 
ultimately cautionary. Take away those same incentives, and amoral actors 
will find no countervailing reasons to behave morally within “the vaguer 
sanctions of [their] conscience.” 78 
For robotics firms duty-bound to maximize profits—not morality—
Holmes’s analogy is no less apposite. Indeed, it illustrates precisely why 
the diagnosis made by many luminaries in the field of machine ethics is 
dead-on, but their prognosis is off.79 Robotics systems of the future will 
undoubtedly make decisions of immense ethical import. But their 
decisionmaking will be guided less by the vagaries of “conscience” than by 
the “prophesy” of profit.80 These robots will view the world not as good 
moral philosophers, but as bad men—concerned less with idealized “ethical 
rule[s]” than with the legal rules that dictate whether their firms will face 
public sanction.81 And those that are instead engineered to follow “a clear 
and consistent” moral code will behave irrationally under a legal code 
lacking both such qualities.82 
Nearly a decade ago, Wallach and Allen warned in Moral Machines 
that “to avoid the consequences of bad autonomous artificial agents, people 
must be prepared to think hard about what it will take to make such agents 
good.”83 But vital as this admonition may be, mere hard thinking is not 
enough. To think profitably about this “engineering challenge”84 requires 
first understanding it as a challenge fundamentally about profit. And if the 
goal of machine ethics is “to frame discussion in a way that constructively 
guides” this effort, machine ethics must begin by acknowledging that firms 
engineering so-called moral machines will be concerned foremost with 
economics, not ethics.85 
 
 77 Id. at 459. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
 80  The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 458–61. 
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 82 See Greene, supra note 18, at 1515. 
 83 MORAL MACHINES, supra note 10, at 7. 
 84 Id. at 8. 
 85 Id. at 6. 
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III.  “BAD MAN” ALGORITHMS AND THE PATH OF ROBOTICS LAW 
It’s not possible to make a moral judgement of the worth of one 
individual person vers[us] another—convict versus nun . . . . When we 
think about the [trolley] problem, we try to cast it in a frame that we 
can actually do something with. 
—Chris Urmson86 
Call Holmes’s outlook dim—even “dismal”87—but the evidence of its 
validity abounds. Happen to activate the “autopilot” function of a Tesla 
while driving down the highway?88 It should come as no surprise that the 
system is designed to closely correlate the car’s speed with the posted legal 
limit.89 At this seemingly trivial engineering decision, few so much as bat 
an eye. But make no mistake, the moral calculus underlying it is as urgent 
as in the trolley problem. 
In theory, Tesla’s engineers could have opted for a different speed 
than that set forth by the law. And each increment or decrement so chosen 
would, in turn, translate to a corresponding variation in risk to the vehicle’s 
passenger, as well as to third parties. Multiply even the slightest change in 
risk by the millions of individuals foreseeably impacted by it, and one is 
left with an ethical dilemma eerily reminiscent of an edge case like the 
trolley problem. Except in this instance, actual lives are on the line. 
Yet, far from expecting Tesla to commission a grand philosophical 
treatise on the precise “moral” speed for each U.S. roadway, most simply 
take it for granted that Tesla’s engineers looked to law and designed 
accordingly. In fact, the failure to see this decision for what it is—as an act 
of profit prevailing over ethics—seems to have less to do with the 
decision’s undeniable moral implications than with the clearly defined 
standards set forth by the law. 
Further, in situations where the law’s mandate is less clear, our ethical 
intuitions may change, but the economic incentives driving the engineers 
do not. Confronted with a moral dilemma wherein the legal system offers 
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less clear-cut guidance, today’s most sophisticated robots reputedly shift to 
a more probabilistic approach.90 According to the robotics scholar Noah 
Goodall: 
Each potential outcome is assigned a likelihood as well as a positive or 
negative magnitude (either a benefit or a cost). Each event’s magnitude is 
multiplied by its likelihood, and the resulting values [are] summed. If the 
benefits outweigh the costs by a reasonable margin, the [robot] . . . execute[s] 
the action . . . .”91 
Should this description sound familiar to readers with a legal 
background, it is for good reason. The calculus is strikingly similar to a 
theory of negligence first formulated by yet another American jurist of 
canonical stature, Learned Hand, who algebraically expressed the legal 
“duty of care” as “a function of three variables:”92 (1) the probability, P, 
that an accident will occur; (2) the magnitude of the resulting loss, L; and 
(3) the burden, B, of taking adequate care to prevent the accident.93 
But while the cost–benefit calculations of Hand’s formula are meant 
to reflect a decision’s actual costs to society—separate from any costs 
imposed by the legal system—calculations performed by robots will be just 
the opposite. Systems optimized for profit will not fret over negative 
externalities, but only those costs the firm can expect to incur.94 
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Accordingly, the negative event magnitude associated with each executable 
action will largely be a function of the action’s foreseeable legal 
sanctions.95 
Or, to borrow a more poetic phrase, these systems will operate as 
“instrument[s] of . . . prophesy”—looking “at the [law] as a bad man” to 
determine the economically optimal course of action.96 Their cost–benefit 
calculations will not maximize morality, but minimize liability. And though 
the complexity of these systems remains constrained by the limits of 
present-day technology, as the feasibility of designing legally sophisticated 
“bad man” algorithms increases with time, so too will the economic 
incentives to implement them. 
Meanwhile, if the “21st-century moral philosophers”97—or anyone 
else for that matter—find the decisions executed by these systems 
unethical, the solution will not entail sermonizing outside the engineering 
headquarters of Google, Tesla, or Mercedes-Benz. Rather, it will require 
realigning existing legal incentives through the piecemeal work of 
democratic change. 
But though the means by which society ultimately shapes robot 
behavior may be less grandiose than some currently imagine, rest assured 
that the end will be no less grand. We, the people, will be the true engineers 
of machine morality. As democratic stakeholders, it will be our collective 
“engineering task” to ensure that even the worst of our robots are 
incentivized to behave as the best of our philosophers. Ironically, success 
on this front will require overturning Holmes’s century-old insight. For it 
will entail designing a legal system that truly closes the gap “between 
morality and law”—thereby rendering meaningless “the practical 
importance of the distinction between” a moral machine and amoral 
machines.98 
CONCLUSION 
Although the notion that a nineteenth-century jurist has much to teach 
about twenty-first century robotics may sound far-fetched, the burgeoning 
fields of robotics law and machine ethics would do well to take stock of 
Holmes’s timeless insight. While his “distinction between morality and 
law”99 may seem a hair-splitting academic maundering, its implications for 
 
 95 But see supra note 69 (clarifying the additional costs that may factor into this calculus under 
certain conditions). 
 96 The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 458–61. 
 97 See Greene, supra note 18. 
 98 The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 459. 
 99 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
250 
engineering are anything but. Great challenges undoubtedly lie ahead for 
societies poised to embed millions of robots with high-stakes 
decisionmaking capabilities. But rising to meet these challenges requires 
first understanding them. For twenty-first century democracies—composed 
of engineers, lawyers, and moral philosophers alike—“this may be where 
the rubber meets the road.”100 
 
 100 See Greene, supra note 18. 
